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Abstract 
Using German panel data, we assess the causal effect of job loss, and thus of an 
extensive income shock, on risk attitude. In line with predictions of expected utility 
reasoning about absolute risk aversion, losing one’s job reduces the willingness to take 
risks. This effect strengthens in previous hourly wage, begins to manifest itself as soon 
as an employee perceives the threat of job loss and is of a transitory nature. The change 
in stated risk attitude matches observable job finding behaviour, confirming the 
behavioural validity of our results.  
 
JEL Classification: D81; J64; J65 





The willingness to take risks strongly affects economically important outcomes such as 
entrepreneurial activity, migration and households’ allocation of financial assets. Some part of 
individual risk attitude is rooted in genetic dispositions, socialisation and personality 
development.1 Beyond that, life experiences such as poverty (e.g. Haushofer and Fehr 2014), 
child birth (Görlitz and Tamm 2015) or being exposed to violence (Callen et al. 2014) shape 
people’s willingness to take risks. The Great Depression (Malmendier and Nagel 2011) and 
natural disasters have been shown to increase risk aversion, probably because the appearance 
of a rare event amplifies its general perception (Cameron and Shah 2015, Goebel et al. 2015). 
We analyse the risk-taking effect of another source of substantial individual risk concerning the 
vast majority of employees in market economies: losing one’s job. As approaching and 
experiencing job loss places, first and foremost, workers’ current and future income in jeopardy, 
this event facilitates a natural experiment for studying the impact of an extensive income shocks 
on risk attitude.  
Previous research does not come up with clear answers on how a negative income shock 
may alter individual risk attitude. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) find that fluctuations in 
household wealth do not yield any adjustment in risk-taking with respect to households’ asset 
allocations, probably because of inertia. Post et al. (2008) analyse repeated decisions of people 
gambling in the TV show ‘Deal or No Deal?’ and conclude that risk aversion increases after 
both belied and excelled expectations. Both Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) as well as Post et 
al. (2008) use data on choices to reveal risk attitude. In principle, other dominant factors (like 
inertia) related to these choices may veil the direct impact of a financial gain or loss on general 
risk attitude, which potentially affects all individual choices. In contrast, we provide evidence 
on the effect of an income shock on a direct measure of risk attitude.  
To the best of our knowledge, Sahm (2012) provides the only existing study on the impact 
of job loss on risk attitudes. Besides various other insights pointing to time-invariant risk-
taking, she does not find that elder workers in the US change risk attitude in the wake of being 
dismissed. In contrast to her, we focus on job losses due to the closure of a complete plant or 
firm and thus on a much more specific type of dismissal. This is for two reasons: First, many 
dismissals may often be preventable by the worker (dismissal due to misconduct or shirking) 
and therefore result from given risk attitude rather than causing a change in risk attitude. 
                                                 
1 See Cesarini et al. (2010), Mata et al. (2012) as well as Harrati (2014) on genetic disposition. See Dohmen et al. 
(2012) as well as the review of Becker et al. (2012) on sozialisation and personality development.  
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Second, the impact of dismissals for any reason may not generalise to the average risk-taking 
effect of job loss since the affected subgroup of workers (low-skilled, health problems) does 
not represent the workforce well.  
To the extent that workers cannot insure the income risk associated with non-controllable 
job loss, its impact on risk attitude will be that of a background risk. Public insurances replace 
wage income only to some extent, and then only for a limited period of time. They do not 
account for the loss of company pensions, the scarring effects of unemployment (reduced 
earnings when reemployed, e.g. Arulampalam et al. 2001) and the loss of non-monetary welfare 
(e.g. reductions of social participation and identity utility, see Kunze and Suppa 2014, Hetschko 
et al. 2014). As a result, we argue that increasing risk of job loss will cause workers to avoid 
other controllable risks more often as decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) characterises 
their utility function.2 
To test this notion by estimating the causal effect of loss of work on risk attitude, we apply 
a difference-in-differences approach based on German Socio-economic Panel data (SOEP). We 
assign workers who experience job loss due to the closure of the complete plant or company to 
the treatment group and similar employees who do not lose their jobs to a control group.3 As a 
behaviourally valid measure of general risk attitude, we use the stated willingness to take risks. 
It turns out that exogenous job loss indeed decreases the willingness to take risks. The effect 
already begins to manifest itself before the job loss event ultimately occurs, as workers may 
perceive that employment is increasingly at risk. Pre-treatment hourly wage as proxy for the 
losses of earnings and nonwage benefits associated with job loss amplifies the negative impact 
of job loss on risk-taking. This confirms that the losses of current income and the fear of losing 
future income are driving forces behind the impact of job loss on risk-taking. In the aftermath 
of the event, the willingness to take risks gradually returns to its initial level as workers become 
reemployed. This suggests that the risk attitude effect of losing work is of a transitory nature. 
The appearance of job loss does not seem to change the future perception of this specific risk 
or of other calamities. Additional empirical analyses point to the behavioural validity and 
economic significance of our findings. 
Our findings not only complement the literature on the origins of risk-taking, they also 
concern the theoretical foundation of the increasingly popular general risk attitude measure we 
                                                 
2 DARA is not only an intuitive, but also an often empirically proven assumption (see, e.g., Bombardini and Trebbi 
(2012) as well as Guiso and Paiella (2008). 
3 We hereby follow, inter alia, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009), Schmitz (2011), Marcus (2013). 
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use.4 Job loss affects the willingness to take risks in the way predicted for absolute risk aversion. 
We therefore recommend using the survey item accordingly. While our study shows that this 
measure responds to certain life events, it should not be implied that general doubts about the 
theoretical assumption of time-invariant general risk preferences, which reflect the shape of the 
utility function, are justified.  Empirical researchers should, however, be aware of the fact that 
the general risk attitude measure is not exogenous to living conditions and life experiences. In 
consequence, if the willingness to take risks is examined regarding its effect on any outcome, 
researchers must consider simultaneity bias.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 applies expected utility reasoning to derive theoretical 
hypotheses about the impact of job loss on risk attitude. In Sections 3 and 4, we describe our 
identification strategy, data and sampling. Section 5 documents the results of our empirical 
analyses and finally Section 6 concludes and discusses our findings.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Consider an individual i with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ( , )i iu w y  that 
describes utility received from future ‘labour income’ wi, and a non-insurable income loss iy . 
Both are defined broadly and can consist of wage and nonwage job characteristics. wi results 
from expectations concerning the benefits of working, adjusted by any risk they can influence. 
In contrast, job loss will concern iy when employees can neither influence its probability, such 
as in the case of plant closure, nor insure themselves comprehensively. As argued in the 
introduction, a significant part of the individual welfare loss associated with job loss may be 
non-insurable. We therefore consider exogenous job loss hereinafter as immutable and non-
insurable background risk.  
Two elements shape the risk of job loss. Its probability JL~ ( | )tP JL ω , which depends on the 
set of information tω  pointing to job loss at a point in time t and the total damage vi resulting 
from job loss. Abstracting from any other immutable risk, the total expected loss from job loss 
is ( | )i t iy P JL v= ω ⋅ . The set of information changes when new information about a job loss 
arrive. If job loss becomes absolutely certain, 2 0( | ) ( | ) 1t tP JL P JL=− =ω < ω =  with 2t=−ω  as 
information set way before the actual job loss takes place and 0t=ω  as set of information right 
after the job loss has occurred. To assess the influence of job loss on risk attitude, we measure 
                                                 
4 For primarily methodological discussions of the survey item see Dohmen et al. (2011) and Charness et al. (2013). 
For recent applications of the item see, for instance, Pannenberg (2010), Jaeger et al. (2010), Dohmen et al. 2012, 
2015a, 2015b, Brachert and Hyll (2014), Skriabikova et al. (2014), Fossen and Glocker (2014), Görlitz and Tamm 
(2015), Schurer (2015), Goebel et al. (2015). 
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its theoretical effect on absolute risk aversion in the spirit of Arrow and Pratt. Following 
















In consequence, the shift in tω  increases the expected loss from job loss for the next considered 
period. By assuming ( , )i iu w y  to imply DARA, an increase in immutable risk raises the level of 
absolute risk aversion (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1987, Kimball 1993, Eeckhoudt et al. 1996).  
Hypothesis 1: Job loss increases the level of ARA. 
Workers may anticipate job loss from a certain point in time onwards. Lacking competiveness 
of the firm, rumours, mass layoffs, or, at the very end, insolvency proceedings may trigger, step 
by step, an update in the information set. The shift in tω  is therefore not a strict binary change, 
but a gradual or iterative process till t = 0 is reached, i.e. 
2 1 0( | ) ( | ) ( | )t t tP JL P JL P JL=− =− =ω < ω < ω . Hence, the job loss probability is likely to grow slowly 
with new arriving information, causing an early update in expectations and, therefore, in ARA, 
too. 
Hypothesis 2: ARA gradually increases before job loss occurs. 
The more time has passed by after a job loss event, the more workers will be observed to be 
reemployed. However, job search takes some time and a new job often starts with probation or 
a fixed-term contract, keeping uncertainty about employment stability and thus uncertainty 
about future incomes at a high level. In short, job loss is still increasing ARA compared to the 
time before the event even when workers have recently started a new job. As time goes by, 
however, employees establish themselves in the new job and gather new information about the 
next involuntary job loss. The new set of information after re-entering employment and passing 
the new job’s uncertainty ( 1t=ω ) should imply a similar job loss prospect as 2t=−ω  does 
( )2 1( | ) ( | )t tP JL P JL=− =ω ≈ ω . Hence, the job loss probability shifts back and so does ARA.  
Hypothesis 3: ARA gradually returns towards its initial level after job loss occurred. 
In addition, we expect heterogeneous effects. As already indicated by the index i, labour market 
income and expected loss differ between individuals due to individual resources. Workers who 
have high levels of education, for instance, earn higher wages than less educated workers and 
thus stand to lose much more, both in terms of future income and in terms of other benefits of 
employment (e.g. status), in the case of job loss. In the following, we refer to those highly paid 
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employees as high-skilled workers (i = h) and to workers with relatively low wages are referred 
to as low-skilled workers (i = l). The heterogeneity results in h lw w>  and h lv v> . Assuming 
the same change in the set of information for both types, the inequality in individual damage 
will yield h ly y∆ > ∆   with ( )0 2( | ) ( | )i t t iy P JL P JL v= =−∆ = ω − ω ⋅ , when an exogenous job loss 
becomes more likely and finally occurs. Whether this leads to a bigger change in ARA for high 
skilled individuals depends on the utility function and the inequality in expected income. By 
assuming DARA, a marginal change in income leads to 
ARA( ) / ( ) ARA( ) / ( )h h l lw y w y w y w y∂ − ∂ − ≤ ∂ − ∂ −     if h h l lw y w y− ≥ −   holds. Hence, 
h ly y∆ > ∆   resolves in a greater change in ARA for h-types only if three conditions are fulfilled: 
First, the difference in income is sufficiently small. Second, ARA is only weakly convex, i.e. 
2 2ARA( ) / ( )h hw y w y∂ − ∂ −   is close to zero. And last, h ly y∆ − ∆   is sufficiently big.  
Hypothesis 4. Job loss changes ARA of high-skilled workers more than ARA of low-skilled workers. 
3.  Data  
Our analysis is based on ten waves (2004-2013) of German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) data 
(Wagner et al. 2007). Each year, roughly 20,000 individuals living in 11,000 households 
provide information about manifold personal perceptions and attitudes, their employment 
status, income, health and much more. The time interval between two SOEP interviews is 
approximately one year. Because of its panel structure and the opportunity to analyse 
exogenously triggered job losses (plant closure) as well as the availability of a continuously 
repeated question on the willingness to take risks, the SOEP stands out when compared with 
other comparable representative panel data sets regarding the purposes of this study.  
As an inverse measure of ARA, we use the following question on general risk attitudes 
(GRA) that is measured in 2004, 2006 and each year from 2008 onwards: 
Would you describe yourself as someone who tries to avoid risks (risk-averse) or 
as someone who is willing to take risks (risk-prone)? Please answer on a scale from 
0 to 10, where 0 means “risk-averse” and 10 means “risk-prone”. 
According to the findings of Dohmen et al. (2011) as well as Fossen and Glocker (2014), people 
answer in line with alternative measurements of risk attitudes (risk attitudes revealed through 
decisions under uncertainty, such as real-stake lotteries, holding stocks, being self-employed, 
educational choices). Thus, the item can be considered a behaviourally valid measure of risk 
attitude, which we will discuss further with respect to our results in Section 5.5. As risk attitudes 
seem to differ to some extent between areas of life, our measure may be even better suited to 
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ascertain risk attitude than hypothetical or actual lotteries and gambles, which confront 
respondents with a very specific situation.  
When workers have terminated an employment relationship between two SOEP interviews, 
they are asked about the specific reason: ‘How did that job end?’. Answers that the ‘office or 
place of work has closed’ (plant closure in the following) identify exogenously triggered job 
losses best. At two points, we make also use of data about other dismissals (‘I was dismissed 
by my employer’) to show how including more endogenous reasons for job loss would affect 
our results. Further possible answers to the question on terminated employment are not 
considered, namely a notice of resignation, mutual agreement with employer, the end of a 
temporary contract, retirement or taking a leave of absence, maternity leave or parental leave.  
The sample we analyse consists of initially ‘regular’ employees only. They are either 
fulltime or part-time employed and spend more than 15 hours per week working, which is the 
legal threshold between marginal employment and regular employment in Germany. 
Observations of self-employed workers are not considered.5 However, we do not restrict the 
sample with respect to workers’ labour market activities after job loss has taken place. Besides 
having taken up a new regular employment, they can be unemployed, have left the workforce, 
or are doing anything else (e.g. occasional jobs). Not being selective at this point avoids any 
systematic bias by sampling. Unemployment duration analyses will distinguish between 
employment states after job loss (Section 5.5). Our sample is limited to workers who are older 
than 20 years, but younger than 65 years. For our investigation period that is restricted by the 
availability of the GRA measure, we can observe 37,700 observations of regular employees, of 
which 239 experience job loss for the reason of plant closure.  
Some individual characteristics are used to identify high-skilled individuals (named h-type 
in Section 2) and low-skilled individuals (l-type) in order to test our fourth hypothesis. First, 
we compute the individual hourly gross wage. It is based on information of actual weekly 
working hours and gross monthly labour income. Second, we use two discrete measurements 
of individual skills. Education is classified according to the ISCED-97 scale. l-types have no 
more than secondary education (up to ISCED-97 level 3, which is the median level). h-types 
are educated at least at ISCED-97 level 4 (anything beyond secondary education). As another 
                                                 
5 We do not exclude public sector employees although they are much less likely to experience plant closure than 
private sector employees. However, excluding public sector would not yield results that are different from those 
presented in the following.  
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alternative, we identify people as h-types that have above-median autonomy in occupational 
actions, such as managers (below-median autonomy as l-types). 
Beyond that, we utilise data on various further socio-demographic characteristics (age, net 
household income adjusted by OECD equivalent weights, overall lifetime unemployment 
experience to date in years, gender, marital status, children living in household, marital status, 
migration background) and job characteristics (gross hourly wage in Euros, tenure in years, 
level of occupational autonomy, company size, daily working hours, part-time employment, 
public sector employment, sector of industry). Finally, we merge our data with precise 
‘INKAR’ (indicators of the development of cities and regions) information about 
unemployment rates of the 96 German planning regions (Raumordnungsregionen, see BBSR 
2015).  
4. Empirical identification 
To test our hypotheses, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to identifying the effect 
of exogenous job loss on the general willingness to take risks. The treatment group of regular 
employees lose their jobs for the reason of plant closure between two SOEP interviews, which 
we refer to as t = −1 and t = 0 in the following. Accordingly, we assume that plant closures 
occur independent of workers’ characteristics. We discuss this assumption and provide 
evidence for its validity in the course of our robustness analysis (Section 5.6). Job loss may 
often bring about job insecurity in t = −1 which means that the treatment might affect the 
willingness to take risks already at this point in time. Our pre-treatment reference point is hence 
t = −2, which means that we assume that workers do not anticipate the plant closure event if it 
takes place at least one year later. A control group of regular employees is included in order to 
control, for instance, for time trends explaining changes in the willingness to take risks. This 
group does not experience a job loss and stays employed at least for the duration of three SOEP 
interviews in a row, which equal t = −2, t = −1 and t = 0.  
We impute missing answers to the willingness to take risks question in t = −2 by the 
previous interview (t = −3), if the individual is observed as employed in this specific period. 
The setting requires that members of the treatment and the control group continue to participate 
in the survey for at least three interviews in a row. Given this and all the other restrictions (such 
as the availability of data on individual characteristics taken into account in the following 
analyses), our sample includes 239 observations in the treatment group and 37,461 observations 
in the control group.  
9 
 
The treatment effect that allows us to test our first hypothesis is the difference between 
treatment and control group in the within-group change of the willingness to take risks between 
t = −2 and t = 0. To be able to consider time effects, we employ a regression approach 
explaining the change in general risk attitude (ΔGRA) between the two points in time, dependent 
on the treatment (dummy Loss = 1, control group: Loss = 0) and the year of t = 0 (Y). We 
include vectors of controls for pre-treatment (measured at t = −2) socio-demographic 
characteristics (SD), job characteristics (JC) and parallel life events (Shocks between t = −2 and 
t = 0) that account for non-random treatment and help us to approach the true average treatment 
effect. The empirical model can be written as 
(1) ' ' ' 'i i i i i i iGRA Loss SD JC Shocks Y∆ = α + β + γ + δ + σ + θ + ε    
with α as the average change of the general risk aversion of the reference group and ui as the 
error term. Consequently, sign and significance of the β-coefficient provide us with evidence 
regarding Hypothesis 1. Subgroup analyses will clarify whether the corresponding regression 
results vary by gender, age or employment status in t = 0.  
Hypothesis 2 suggests decreasing GRA awhile for some time directly before job loss. We 
therefore test whether a negative effect of Lossi appears when we estimate ΔGRA as the 
difference between the two pre-treatment points in time t = −2 and t = −1. Regarding reversion 
of the potential job loss effect on risk-taking (Hypothesis 3), we define the change in GRA 
between t = −2 to t = 1 as dependent variable. In addition, we can test whether the willingness 
to take risks of treatment and control group follow a common trend before the treatment takes 
place by estimating ΔGRA between t = −3 to t = −2.  
According to Hypothesis 4, an effect of job loss on the absolute risk aversion is supposed 
to be driven by high-skilled workers, which we approximate by pre-treatment gross hourly 
wage, education and level of educational autonomy (Section 3). To examine the role of these 
characteristics, it is not sufficient to test whether adding them to (1) alters β. If Hypothesis 4 
holds, a variation in skills plays a different role for the treatment group than for the control 
group: high-skilled treated are exposed to a bigger income loss than low-skilled ones, when a 
job loss arises. As discussed in Section 2, this implies a heterogeneity of the subsequent change 
in GRA within this group, i.e. ∆GRA should vary by pre-treatment skills. In contrast, if no 
additional threats arise the level of income risk should have no effect on ∆GRA. Therefore, the 
level of skills will have a different impact on the change in GRA between treatment and control 
group. We therefore need to estimate interaction effects of proxies for skills and Lossi in order 
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to examine whether skills matter to the risk attitude effect of losing work. The best 
representation of individual productivity and, hence, future income and employment prospects, 
may be one’s (pre-treatment) gross hourly wage (Wagei). We therefore modify (1) and estimate 
(2)   
In addition, we test interactions of the treatment dummy with education and autonomy in 
occupational actions as further proxies for individual productivity.  
5. Results 
5.1 Mean analyses 
As a first step of our difference-in-differences analysis, we compare the average two-year 
change from t = −2 to t = 0 in the general willingness to take risks between treatment and 
control group (see Table 1). It turns out that job loss is indeed accompanied by a 0.4 point 
stronger reduction in willingness to take risks than staying employed (p < 0.05). Moreover, the 
descriptive figures do not imply a selection into the treatment by relatively risk-averse or 
relatively risk-prone people as the pre-treatment level of GRA does not differ significantly 
between the two groups.  
The figures imply that the treatment is not completely random. Members of the control 
group receive higher wages and have more household income available, can act more 
autonomously in their firms, work in bigger firms, work less hours and are less likely to work 
in the private sector than people who experience job loss about one to two years later. In 
addition, job loss due to plant closure is more prevalent in some industries, such as services, 
than in others. All further characteristics presented in Table 1 do not concern one of the two 
groups more significantly than the other.  
 
1 2 3( )
              ' ' ' '
i i i i i
i i i i i
GRA Loss Loss Wage Wage
SD JC Shocks Y
∆ = α + β + β × + β
+ γ + δ + σ + θ + ε
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
    Scale Treatment group Control group Difference 
Number of observations:  239 37,461   
      










Willingness to take risks        
 GRA (pre-treatment, mean) 0 - 10 4.77 2.19 4.64 2.13  0.356 
 Change in GRA (mean)  -0.39 2.22 -0.09 2.19  0.034 
Pre-treatment socio-demographic characteristics 
 Age in years (mean)  44.92 9.49 43.73 9.67  0.747 
 Monthly net household income in Euros (mean)  1,612 686.63 1,843 979.99  0.000 
 Educational level (mean) 1 - 6 3.64 1.29 4.04 1.44  0.000 
 Years of unemployment (mean)  0.54 1.17 0.43 1.12  0.132 
 Local unemployment rate (mean)  0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04  0.310 
 Men (share)  0.62  0.56   0.079 
 Child in household (share)  0.37  0.35   0.646 
 Married (share)  0.68  0.64   0.274 
 Migration background (share)  0.15  0.09   0.010 
 East Germany (share)  0.26  0.24   0.441 
Parallel life events (shares)        
 New job  0.62  0.10   0.000 
 Divorce  0.03  0.01   0.135 
 Separation  0.04  0.03   0.496 
 Death of spouse  0.00  0.00   0.681 
 Marriage  0.04  0.04   0.622 
 Child birth  0.04  0.03   0.681 
 Move (change of flat/house)  0.03  0.03   0.919 
Pre-treatment job characteristics        
 Monthly net wage in Euros (mean)  14.51 7.33 16.32 8.38  0.000 
 Tenure in years (mean)  12.18 9.64 12.93 10.03  0.229 
 Level of occupational autonomy (mean) 1 - 5 2.60 1.00 2.94 1.06  0.000 
 Company size (mean) 1 - 3 2.12 0.83 2.33 0.77  0.000 
 Weekly working hours (mean)  41.48 9.02 40.86 9.54  0.285 
 Part time contract (share)  0.16  0.18   0.285 
 Public sector (share)  0.07  0.32   0.000 
 Sector of industry (shares, sum = 1.00)        
 Extraction, exploitation   0.02  0.04   0.006 
 Production   0.32  0.26   0.039 
 Construction   0.08  0.05   0.096 
 Trade and transport   0.08  0.06   0.226 
 Services   0.27  0.11   0.000 
 Media, finance, real estate   0.14  0.14   0.921 
 Administration, education, health   0.10  0.35   0.000 




5.2 The effect of job loss on the willingness to take risks 
In the following, we present OLS estimations of our empirical model (1). The corresponding 
results are presented in Table 2. We find a significantly negative effect of experiencing job loss 
due to plant closure on GRA when controlling for the year of the interview of t = 0 only 
(Column 2.1). We can thus conclude that the treatment effect does not originate from time 
trends in risk aversion. Improving the comparability of treatment group and control group by 
adding controls for pre-treatment socio-demographic characteristics only marginally affects the 
size of the job loss coefficient (Column 2.2). The same applies to enlarging the model by further 
controls for parallel life events accompanying job loss (Column 2.3) as well as pre-treatment 
job characteristics (Column 2.4). In sum, the differences in pre-treatment characteristics 
described in the previous section seem rather unimportant for the identification of the average 
treatment effect. Altogether, the results presented in Table 2 strongly support our first 
hypothesis, suggesting that job loss reduces GRA, i.e. increases absolute risk aversion. Beyond 
the purpose of our study, we find that another life event, separation, increases willingness to 
take risks.  
Subjective survey items like GRA may undergo a structural change when the event of 
interest affects the general answering behaviour of survey participants. Hence, the effect does 
not necessarily need to reflect an actual change in the willingness to take risk, but rather results 
from a change in the participant’s mood. To test this notion, we add additional subjective 
covariates to model (1) that may be affected by mood effects, but are unrelated to our dependent 
variable, namely the individual change in worries about environmental protection, maintaining 
peace and crime in Germany. As none of the listed items changes the estimation results, we do 




Table 2: OLS estimation of the effect of job loss on risk tolerance 
  (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
                  
Job loss between t = −1 and t = 0 -0.292** (0.142) -0.311** (0.142) -0.328** (0.145) -0.326** (0.145) 
         
Pre-treatment socio-demographics         
Age in years   0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
Monthly HH income (log)   -0.025 (0.030) -0.026 (0.030) -0.002 (0.034) 
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)         
Level 1   0.272 (0.191) 0.275 (0.191) 0.248 (0.193) 
Level 2   0.128** (0.057) 0.130** (0.057) 0.104* (0.059) 
Level 3   0.068 (0.041) 0.070* (0.041) 0.057 (0.042) 
Level 5   0.047 (0.051) 0.046 (0.051) 0.043 (0.052) 
Level 6   0.018 (0.043) 0.019 (0.043) 0.034 (0.046) 
Years of unemployment   -0.011 (0.011) -0.012 (0.011) -0.011 (0.011) 
Local unemployment rate (%)   -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Men   0.041* (0.022) 0.043* (0.023) 0.056** (0.028) 
Child in HH   0.060** (0.026) 0.060** (0.026) 0.065** (0.028) 
Married   0.037 (0.027) 0.038 (0.028) 0.034 (0.028) 
Migration background   0.097** (0.047) 0.099** (0.047) 0.083* (0.048) 
East Germany   0.049 (0.039) 0.051 (0.039) 0.051 (0.040) 
         
Parallel life events         
New job     0.018 (0.037) 0.029 (0.037) 
Divorce     -0.124 (0.095) -0.122 (0.095) 
Separation     0.224*** (0.061) 0.226*** (0.061) 
Death of spouse     0.098 (0.287) 0.100 (0.287) 
Marriage     0.006 (0.059) 0.005 (0.059) 
Child birth     0.004 (0.065) 0.004 (0.065) 
Move (change of flat/house)     -0.041 (0.090) -0.036 (0.090) 
         
Pre-treatment job characteristics         
Gross hourly wage (Euros)       -0.001 (0.002) 
Tenure in years       0.001 (0.001) 
Level of occ. autonomy (ref. level 3)         
Level 1       0.034 (0.050) 
Level 2       0.010 (0.033) 
Level 4       -0.015 (0.033) 
Level 5       -0.027 (0.056) 
Company size up to 20 Emp.       -0.033 (0.034) 
Company size more than 200 Emp.       0.000 (0.000) 
Weekly working hours       0.004 (0.026) 
Part-time contract       -0.004** (0.002) 
Public sector       -0.049 (0.042) 
Sector of industry (ref. services)         
Extraction, Exploitation       0.004 (0.034) 
Production       0.007 (0.068) 
Construction       0.009 (0.044) 
Trade, transport       0.009 (0.063) 
Media, finance, real estate       -0.040 (0.059) 
Administration, education, health       -0.053 (0.047) 
         
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant 0.355*** (0.029) 0.215*** (0.051) 0.203*** (0.052) 0.219*** (0.066) 
         
Observations 37,700 37,700 37,700 37,700 
Adjusted R² 0.053  0.054  0.055  0.055  
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. The table presents OLS estimates of the change in GRA between t = −2 and t = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference period is 2012, the reference group are employed 
not experiencing an involuntary job loss with average age, tenure, years in unemployment, local unemployment 
rate, hourly gross wage, level of autonomy and weekly working hours as well as ISCED level 4. Household (HH) 
income weighted by OECD equivalent weights.  
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We repeat estimating the model with all of the controls (1) for age and gender subgroups 
separately in order to test whether some of those amplify our results in particular (Table 3). As 
the initial sample, all subgroups show a negative sign of the treatment effect. While age groups 
hardy vary in the size of the effect, the gender gap is larger, suggesting men respond somewhat 
stronger to job loss than women. However, job loss and gender interaction effects in an 
estimation with the whole sample do not imply statistical significance for this gap.  
Table 3. Subgroup results for the effect of job loss on risk tolerance 
 OLS estimate of  job loss between t = −1 and t = 0  
(2.4)   the whole sample – 0.326**  (0.145) 
(3.1)   age ≤ 44 years – 0.353*  (0.198) 
(3.2)   age ≥ 45 years – 0.261    (0.210) 
(3.3)   women only – 0.187      (0.226) 
(3.4)   men only – 0.421**  (0.187) 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013.  
Note. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the change in general willingness to take risks. Controls are 
specified as in Table 2, Column 2.4. 44 is the sample median in age. Complete 
results are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.  
Further analyses reveal the importance of limiting the treatment group to workers who have lost 
their jobs for the reason of plant closure. Including any dismissal by employer substantially 
increases the coefficient of job loss on the willingness to take risks compared to Table 2. 
Depending on the respective specification of (1), the β-coefficient for the broadly defined 
treatment group is either slightly above or below zero, but always statistically insignificant. In 
line with our theoretical considerations, losing work may not take people by surprise who are 
dismissed for personal reasons and they may not lose much income in the wake of the event as 
they are more likely to receive low earnings. This can in principle explain why our results differ 
from those of Sahm (2012). 
5.3 Anticipation and reversion 
As companies get into trouble before they close (plants), workers will perceive an increase in 
the risk of job loss and start to adjust absolute risk aversion before the actual closure 
(Hypothesis 2). We therefore expect decreasing willingness to take risks between t = −2 and 
t = −1 with the treated. To test this notion, we redefine the dependent variable as the change in 
GRA between t = −2 and t = −1 and estimate the full model (1) again. Similarly, we test the 
assumption of no anticipation of job loss before t = −2 by repeating our estimation of the full 
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model for the change in GRA between t = −3 and t = −2. Figure 1 displays the treatment effects 
of these analyses, including the previous estimate of the impact of job loss in the change in 
GRA from t = −2 to t = 0 as a yardstick. In line with Hypothesis 2, increasing uncertainty on 
the eve of job loss decreases the willingness to take risks from t = −2 to t = −1 (p = 0.067). In 
contrast, we do not observe a significant and substantial effect of future job loss on the change 
in GRA from t = −3 to t = −2, suggesting that the risk attitude of treatment and control group 
both follow a common trend before the event.  
As described in Section 1, life events like very rare disasters change the perception of the 
respective risk and thus increase risk aversion permanently. To test whether this applies to job 
loss as well, we estimate the model (1) again for the change in GRA between t = −2 and the 
second interview after the event has taken place, t = 1 (i.e. approximately 1 to 2 years after job 
loss). This produces no significant effect of job loss, suggesting that the increase in risk aversion 
until t = 0 is completely reversed afterwards. Experiencing job loss does not seem to increase 
its perception in the future.  
Figure 1. Anticipation and reversion effects of job loss on risk tolerance 
 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. The figure illustrates the timeline of treatment effects obtained by running separate 
estimations of changes in GRA from different reference points in time between t = −3 and t = 1 
to t = −2. Droplines denote effect sizes. Whiskers denote 90% confidence intervals. Note that the 
β-coefficients are predicted values based on the model specification presented in Column 2.4 of 
Table 2 (full set of controls). Complete results of the underlying estimations are presented in 
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5.4 High-skilled versus low-skilled workers 
Throughout the whole analysis, we have assumed that the loss of current income and shattered 
future income expectations are the main reasons why job loss may alter risk-taking. As a check 
in this direction, Hypothesis 4 predicts that high-skilled workers (h-type) may respond more 
strongly to an exogenous job loss than low-skilled workers (l-type). We therefore return to the 
estimation of the change of GRA between t = −2 and t = 0 as dependent variable and estimate 
separately the effects of interactions of the job loss variable with indicators of individual 
productivity and proxies for skills.  
Interacting job loss and pre-treatment gross hourly wage, as introduced by (2), yields the 
strongest support for Hypothesis 4 (Column 4.1 of Table 4). At a hypothetical wage of zero 
euros, losing work increases ∆GRA though not significantly. Each additional euro earned per 
hour before job loss changes the effect of job loss on GRA significantly by −0.036 points. 
Further checks reveal that the linear specification of this relationship seems reasonable. Thus, 
job loss reduces GRA by −0.271 points (−0.325 points) at the median (mean) wage of 12.99 
euros (14.51 euros).  
Similarly, the GRAs of highly educated workers and workers with high pre-treatment 
occupational autonomy (as further h-type proxies) respond somewhat more negatively to job 
loss than the GRAs of the respective l-types (Columns 4.2 and 4.3). However, these differences 
are not statistically significant (Wald-test for linear combination of β1 − (β2 + β3) yield 
p = 0.529 (education) and p = 0.459 (autonomy)). These possible differences might reflect the 
role of income again and point to non-wage characteristics like status and identity (education 
and autonomy as proxies for occupational position).  
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Table 4. Estimation by level of skill 






by level of 
autonomy  
    
Job loss 0.197   
 (0.321)   
Gross hourly wage  -0.001   
 (0.002)   
Job loss × gross hourly wage -0.036**   
 (0.016)   
Job loss × h-type (β1)  -0.388* -0.416*** 
  (0.207) (0.161) 
Job loss × l-type (β2)  -0.252 -0.214 
  (0.189) (0.235) 
l-type (β3)  0.036 0.017 
  (0.027) (0.030) 
    
Controls: year dummies, socio-demographics, 
parallel shocks, job characteristics yes yes yes 
    
Constant 0.266*** 0.241*** 0.214*** 
 (0.082) (0.060) (0.066) 
Observations 37,700 37,700 37,700 
Adjusted R² 0.055 0.055 0.055 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hourly wage 
calculated by gross monthly labour income and actual weekly working hours (in Euros). 
Complete results of the underlying estimations are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
5.5 Employment status after job loss and the behavioural validity of stated risk attitude  
Workers’ behaviour after job loss allows us to discuss the behavioural validity of our findings 
on the stated willingness. Those individuals who change GRA most in response to job loss 
should also be interested in reducing the damage as soon as possible by finding a new job. 
Workers’ who are observed as reemployed at some early point in time after job loss may thus 
have reduced willingness to take risks in particular. One might object that having found a job 
balances the negative consequences of job loss, which is why reemployed people might have 
readjusted their willingness to take risks, but this may be much more relevant in the long-run 
than in the short-run (see also Section 5.3). At the beginning of a new employment spell, 
workers have to survive probation (up to 0.5 years in Germany), are employed on a fixed-term 
basis only, implying that their future employment stability and incomes are still at risk.  
The time interval between job loss and the next SOEP interview is six months on average 
in our sample. This should be sufficient for most workers to get at least one offer to take up a 
new employment. In fact, the majority of workers have even started a new regular job in the 
meantime (133 treated observations), whereas smaller groups are still registered as unemployed 
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(66) or do anything else (40, e.g. marginal employment). Estimating interaction effects of job 
loss and these three states based on model (1) reveals that the reemployed have reduced their 
willingness to take risks significantly more than workers who are still unemployed. As this 
result also holds for subgroups of relatively low educated workers and relatively low wage 
earners (as measured before job loss), it does not seem to reflect the high-skilled-low-skilled 
difference of the previous Section 5.4 again. It rather points to a self-selection of workers into 
reemployment who have reduced their willingness to take risks particularly.  
The smaller group of unemployed workers who have not accepted a job offer six months 
after job loss does not show any negative effect of job loss on GRA (the interaction effect of 
job loss and being unemployed is positive in all model specifications, but statistically 
insignificant). This points to a selection of workers into lasting unemployment who are not 
described accurately by the assumptions we have made in Section 2. For instance, if there exists 
a small group of workers with increasing absolute risk aversion in income (IARA), they will 
not reduce their willingness to take risks in response to job loss and are hence ready to stay 
unemployed for a longer time than the average worker while waiting for a good job match.  
As a further check of the behavioural validity of our results, we calculate the impact of the 
individual change in GRA between t = −2 and t = 0 on the job search duration of the treated. 
A parametric survival time regression model is estimated using a Weibull distribution with the 
start of regular part-time or fulltime employment as exit event of interest. Individuals who retire, 
take part in training schemes or are marginally employed after job loss are excluded from the 
analysis, because it is not clear whether they actually search for a regular job. Additionally, we 
do not consider observations of workers who do not report an exact start date of their new 
employment or report more than 60 months of unemployment. Altogether, we obtain 187 spells 
out of our initial sample of 239. 154 report the exit event. To control for demand effects on the 
probability of job finding after job loss, we control for education (ISCED level) and pre-
treatment (t = −2) gross hourly wage. In addition, we include gender as explaining variable. 
Men might feel pushed more to search for a new job because of their breadwinner identity. As 
shown in Table A4, ∆GRA between t = −2 and t = 0 is negatively related to the probability of 
job finding, i.e. the more it reduces in response to job loss the quicker people are observed as 
reemployed. Figure 2 illustrates the predicted survival rates when GRA changes by 0, −1 or −2 
after job loss. A reduction in GRA by one (two) point(s) reduces the expected time in 
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unemployment by approximately half a month (one month) compared to a zero change.6 In sum, 
we find evidence in support of the view that those workers who adjust risk attitude in particular 
in response to job loss try to reduce the associated damage as soon as possible by searching 
intensely for a new job. 
Figure 2. Survival rates depending on the individual change in GRA 
 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. Predicted survival rates for ∆GRA = 0, ∆GRA = −1 and ∆GRA = −2, based on the 
model specification displayed in Column (4.3) of Table A4. 
5.6 Robustness checks 
In this section, we analyse possible threats to the validity of our identifying assumption, 
according to which job losses triggered by plant closures hit workers exogenously. A first issue 
to consider is that of small firms. When the failing business employs a very few people only, 
the single employee can influence the firms’ survival. We therefore run our estimations again 
based on samples excluding employees of small firms stepwise (below five / below ten / below 
twenty employees). Compared to the initial estimations presented up to here, the effects of job 
loss on the willingness to take risks slightly increases in size (while staying statistically 
significant) the more we exclude small firms. Thus, the more the exogeneity assumption is 
reasonable, the stronger are our results.  
                                                 
6 As we find anticipation on the eve of job loss, people may start searching for a new job before the event ultimately 
occurs. A negative anticipation effect (∆GRA from t = −2 to t = −1) should thus expedite reemployment. In fact, 
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If related to risk attitudes, self-selection out of the firm before job loss might take place as 
we have seen that people may often anticipate plant closure from a certain point in time onwards 
(Section 5.3). It is a priori not clear into which direction such a selection leads. Assume workers 
realise at some point in time that the probability of a plant closure increases. People who 
respond by leaving the firm take the risks of immediate unemployment and job search as well 
as the risk of uncertain characteristics associated with a potential new job and might thus be 
relatively risk-prone. However, workers who stay in a firm that is on the rocks take the 
increasing risk of future unemployment and job search, which could also reflect high 
willingness to take risks. These two forces work in opposite directions, which could explain 
why pre-treatment GRA does not vary significantly between treatment and control group (Table 
1 in Section 5.1). To analyse this insight further, we estimate the probability to experience a job 
loss triggered by plant closure starting from t = −2 in about one to two years conditioned on the 
willingness to take risks in t = −2. As some of the individual characteristics documented in 
Table 1 differ on average between treatment and control group, we also consider the full set of 
socio-demographics and job characteristics in this part of the analysis. Columns A5.1 and A5.2 
in Table A5 in the Appendix document the corresponding probit estimation results. They hardly 
point to any selection into plant closure. Neither the level of the willingness to take risks nor 
other variables explains the probability of experiencing this reason for job loss in the near 
future, except some of the sector of industry dummies.  
Applying the same probit estimations to the probability of experiencing any dismissal other 
than plant closure in the next two years supports the conclusion from the regression results that 
those terminations of employment are rather endogenous, which is in line with the results of 
Sahm (2012). Workers are the more likely to be dismissed the higher their willingness to take 
risks, age and number of years they spent unemployed in the past as well as the lower their level 
of education (Columns A5.3 and A5.5 in Table A5). In contrast, tenure, working hours, overall 
income and labour earnings decrease the probability of being dismissed in the near future. As 
many observables are related to other types of dismissal, selection on unobservables may also 
be a big issue here. It is hence a reasonable strategy to focus on plant closures only, although 
the number of observations is not very high. 
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5.7 Economic significance of the job loss effect on the willingness to take risks 
To further assess the economic meaningfulness of our findings, we compare the marginal effect 
of GRA on different economic decisions with the change in GRA caused by loss of job. In so 
doing, we can clarify whether the results potentially translate into a meaningful change in 
behaviour under uncertainty. Table 5 lists marginal effects of GRA on different economic 
decisions which have been identified in the literature. Hereinafter, a male worker who has 
adjusted GRA by −0.421 in response to job loss according to Table 3 serves as an example for 
our results. 
According to Bonin et al. (2007) an increase in GRA of one point increases the monthly 
earning by 1.3%. Therefore, in case of a job loss the reduction in GRA of −0.421 for men could 
resolve in a reduction in monthly wages by 0.5% (−0.421 × 0.013). The marginal effect of GRA 
for the probability of being public sector employed identified by Pfeifer (2010) is −0.8% by a 
given average probability of 32.0%, a job loss would translate in an increasing probability to 
work in the public sector by 0.33%-points (−0.421 × −0.008). A bigger effect can be expected 
for everyday decisions examined by Dohmen et al. (2011). A job loss could reduce the average 
probability of investments in stocks by 3.5% (−0.421 × 0.029 / 0.341), of doing sports by 3.9% 
and of smoking by 5.3%. Caliendo et al. (2014) estimate an average probability to enter self-
employment within one year of 1.1%. This transition probability decreases by 0.02%-points 
when GRA reduces by one point. Straightforward, when a job loss reduces the GRA of men by 
−0.421, the probability to start one one’s business decreases by 0.008%-points which equals a 
relative drop in probability of 0.7%. Another effect can be expected with respect to migration. 
Jaeger et al. (2010) estimate a marginal effect of GRA on the decision to migrate within the 
next five years by 0.26%-points for a given average probability of 5.8%. A job loss thus causes 
a reduction of the migration probability for males by 0.0026 × −0.421 = −0.1%-points or by 2% 
of the average probability to migrate in the next five years.  
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Table 5. Marginal effects of GRA in the literature 






(in percentage points) 
    
Bonin et al. (2007) Monthly earnings  1.3 
    
Jaeger et al. (2010) Migration within next five years 5.8 0.3 
    
Pfeifer (2010) Being public sector employed 32.0 -0.8 
    
Dohmen et al. (2011) Investment in stocks 34.1 2.9 
 Doing active sports 66.2 6.1 
 Smoking 29.4 3.7 
    
Caliendo et al. (2014) Enter self-employment within next year 1.1 0.02 
    
Note. As GRA is included in a non-linear manner in Caliendo et al. (2014), marginal effect is given for 
GRA equal to 5. All studies estimate a binary choice model, except Bonin et al. (2007). Marginal effect in 
Bonin et al. (2007) is a semi-elasticity and given in percent. 
6. Conclusions 
The principle possibility of job loss produces the most important income risk to most workers. 
Our results show that an increase in this risk reduces the willingness to take other risks. They 
thus correspond to recent findings of the research on similar background risks like disasters that 
imply an analogous change in risk aversion. However, the impacts of a rare disaster and the 
more common loss of employment may have different origins. Since we find the risk-taking 
effect of job loss to be of a transitory nature only, it does not seem to come from a general 
change in the individual perception of this specific risk, as it has been discussed with respect to 
natural disasters (e.g. Cameron and Shah 2015). Instead, we find strong evidence that the 
income shock associated with job loss changes risk attitude for some time. 
Our findings do not match those of the study that is related most closely to ours and does 
not reveal an effect of job loss on risk-taking (Sahm 2012). In principle, this might originate 
from the different countries analysed or the different direct measures of risk attitude applied, 
but we suspect the composition of the treatment groups is crucial here. We would also be not 
able to measure a significant effect if our treated included all dismissed workers like that of 
Sahm (2012), instead of being limited to losses of work for the reason of plant closure. People 
who are dismissed for personal reasons might have been able to affect the risk of job loss and 
are thus not surprised in the case that job loss occurs. As a consequence, they do not modify 
risk attitude.  
23 
 
The GRA as a directly measured risk attitude responds clearly to the negative shock of loss 
of work. Whether this maps into decision-making in various contexts cannot be documented 
per se, because behavioural changes can be hampered by inertia (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008) 
or other dominant factors. At least on the labour market, however, our results are reflected in 
workers’ decisions as they accept job offers according to the change job loss has caused in their 
risk attitude. The stronger workers’ willingness to take risks responds to the event, the quicker 
they are observed as reemployed, probably to the end of reducing the income loss associated 
with job loss.  
The fact that the GRA measure we use responds to job loss has two methodological 
implications. Firstly, research on the impact of risk attitude on any outcome cannot assume this 
measure to be exogenously given like a stable personality trait. Reverse causality and third 
variable bias can in principle concern such analyses. Secondly, the overall pattern we document 
is very consistent with the view that the GRA measures absolute risk aversion or, in other words, 
a local risk preference. GRA changes as background risk in the utility function is altered by the 
(forthcoming) calamity and it returns to its initial level as the consequences of job loss are 
removed. In the absence of contrary theoretical foundations of the GRA, this speaks in favour 
of using the survey item as inverse measure of ARA. It also implies that our findings should 
not be misinterpreted as evidence for unstable general risk preferences, which are reflected by 
the shape of the utility function. Quite the contrary, they are well compatible with expected 





Arulampalam, Wiji, Paul Gregg, and Mary Gregory (2001): “Unemployment scarring”, The 
Economic Journal 111(475), pp. F577–F584. 
BBSR - Federal Institute for Research on Building Urban Affairs and Spatial Development 
(2015): INKAR: Indicators and Maps for Urban Affairs and Spatial Development, 
http://www.inkar.de/. 
Becker, Anke, Thomas Deckers, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, and Fabian Kosse (2012): “The 
relationship between economic preferences and psychological personality measures”, 
Annual Review of Economics 4, pp. 453–478. 
Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi (2012): “Risk aversion and expected utility theory: 
an experiment with large and small stakes”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association 10(6), pp. 1348–1399. 
Bonin, Holger, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde (2007): “Cross-
sectional earnings risk and occupational sorting: the role of risk attitudes”, Labour 
Economics 14(6), pp. 926–937. 
Brachert, Matthias and Walter Hyll (2014): On the stability of preferences: repercussions of 
entrepreneurship on risk attitudes, IWH Discussion Paper No. 2014,5. 
Brunnermeier, Markus K and Stefan Nagel (2008): “Do wealth fluctuations generate time-
varying risk aversion? Micro-evidence on individuals’ asset allocation”, The American 
Economic Review 98(3), pp. 713–736. 
Caliendo, Marco, Frank M. Fossen, and Alexander S. Kritikos (2014): “Personality 
characteristics and the decisions to become and stay self-employed”, Small Business 
Economics 42, pp. 787–814. 
Callen, Michael, Mohammad Isaqzadeh, James D. Long, and Charles Sprenger (2014): 
“Violence and risk preference: experimental evidence from Afghanistan”, American 
Economic Review 104(1), pp. 123–148. 
Cameron, Lisa and Manisha Shah (2015): “Risk-taking behaviour in the wake of natural 
disasters”, Journal of Human Resources 50(2), pp. 484–515. 
Cesarini, David, Magnus Johannesson, Paul Lichtenstein, Örjan Sandewall, and Björn Wallace 
(2010): “Genetic variation in financial decision-making”, Journal of Finance 65(5), pp. 
1725–1754. 
Charness, Gary, Uri Gneezy, and Alex Imas (2013): “Experimental methods: eliciting risk 
preferences”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 87, pp. 43–51. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. 
Wagner (2011): “Individual risk attitudes: measurement, determinants, and behavioral 
consequences”, Journal of the European Economic Association 9(3), pp. 522–550. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde (2012): “The intergenerational 
transmission of risk and trust attitudes”, Review of Economic Studies 79, pp. 645–677. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, Bart Golsteyn, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde (2015a): “Risk 




Dohmen, Thomas, Hartmut Lehmann, and Norberto Pignatti (2015b): “Time-varying 
individual risk attitudes over the great recession: a comparison of Germany and Ukraine”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics forthcoming. 
Eeckhoudt, Louis, Christian Gollier, and Harris Schlesinger (1996): “Changes in background 
risk and risk taking behavior”, Econometrica 64(3), pp. 683–689. 
Fossen, Frank M. and Daniela Glocker (2014): Stated and revealed heterogeneous risk 
preferences in educational choice, Freie Universität Berlin School of Business & 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 2014/03. 
Goebel, Jan, Christian Krekel, Tim Tiefenbach, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth (2015): “How natural 
disasters can affect environmental concerns, risk aversion, and even politics: evidence 
from Fukushima and three European countries”, Journal of Population Economics 28(4), 
pp. 1137–1180. 
Görlitz, Katja and Marcus Tamm (2015): Parenthood and risk preferences, IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 8947. 
Guiso, Luigi and Monica Paiella (2008): “Risk aversion, wealth, and background risk”, Journal 
of the European Economic Association 6(6), pp. 1109–1150. 
Harrati, Amal (2014): “Characterizing the genetic influences on risk aversion”, Biodemography 
and Social Biology 60, pp. 185–198. 
Haushofer, Johannes and Ernst Fehr (2014): “On the psychology of poverty”, Science 344, pp. 
862–867. 
Hetschko, Clemens, Andreas Knabe, and Ronnie Schöb (2014): “Changing identity: retiring 
from unemployment”, The Economic Journal 124(575), pp. 149–166. 
Jaeger, David A, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, and Holger 
Bonin (2010): “Direct evidence on risk attitudes and migration”, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 92(August), pp. 684–689. 
Kassenboehmer, Sonja C. and John P. Haisken-DeNew (2009): “You’re fired! The causal 
negative effect of entry unemployment on life satisfaction”, The Economic Journal 
119(536), pp. 448–462. 
Kihlstrom, Richard E., David Romer, and Steve Williams (1981): “Risk aversion with random 
initial wealth”, Econometrica 49(4), pp. 911–920. 
Kimball, Miles S. (1993): “Standard risk aversion”, Econometrica 61(3), pp. 589–611. 
Kunze, Lars and Nicolai Suppa (2014): Bowling alone or bowling at all ? The effect of 
unemployment on social participation, Ruhr Economic Papers No. 510. 
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2011): “Depression babies: do macroeconomic experiences 
affect risk taking?”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), pp. 373–416. 
Marcus, Jan (2013): “The effect of unemployment on the mental health of spouses - Evidence 
from plant closures in Germany”, Journal of Health Economics 32(3), pp. 546–558. 
Mata, Rui, Robin Hau, Andreas Papassotiropoulos, and Ralph Hertwig (2012): “DAT1 
polymorphism is associated with risk taking in the balloon analogue risk task (BART)”, 
PLoS ONE 7(6). 
Nachman, David C (1982): “Preservation of “more risk averse” under expectations”, Journal 
of Economic Theory 28(2), pp. 361–368. 
26 
 
Pannenberg, Markus (2010): “Risk attitudes and reservation wages of unemployed workers: 
evidence from panel data”, Economics Letters 106(3), pp. 223–226. 
Pfeifer, Christian (2010): “Risk aversion and sorting into public sector employment”, German 
Economic Review 12(1), pp. 85–99. 
Post, Thierry, Martijn J. Van Den Assem, Guido Baltussen, and Richard H. Thaler (2008): 
“Deal or no deal ? Decision making under risk in a large-payoff game show”, American 
Economic Review 98(1), pp. 38–71. 
Pratt, John W and Richard J Zeckhauser (1987): “Proper risk aversion”, Econometrica 55(1), 
pp. 143–154. 
Sahm, Claudia (2012): “How much does risk tolerance change?”, Quarterly Journal of Finance 
2(4). 
Schmitz, Hendrik (2011): “Why are the unemployed in worse health? The causal effect of 
unemployment on health”, Labour Economics 18(1), pp. 71–78. 
Schurer, Stefanie (2015): Lifecycle patterns in the socioeconomic gradient of risk preferences, 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 8821. 
Skriabikova, Olga J., Thomas Dohmen, and Ben Kriechel (2014): “New evidence on the 
relationship between risk attitudes and self-employment”, Labour Economics 30, pp. 176–
184. 
Wagner, Gert G., Joachim R. Frick, and Jürgen Schupp (2007): “The German Socio-Economic 







Table A1. OLS estimations of subgroup analysis 
 Subgroup Age ≤ 44 Age > 44 Women only Men only 
                  
Job loss between t = -1 and t = 0 -0.353* (0.198) -0.261 (0.210) -0.187 (0.226) -0.421** (0.187) 
         
Pre-treatment socio-demographics         
Age in years     0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Monthly HH income (log) 0.011 (0.051) -0.012 (0.046) -0.029 (0.051) 0.013 (0.048) 
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)         
Level 1 0.245 (0.277) 0.262 (0.267) 0.325 (0.332) 0.213 (0.238) 
Level 2 0.087 (0.079) 0.123 (0.093) 0.142 (0.089) 0.082 (0.079) 
Level 3 0.074 (0.052) 0.032 (0.075) 0.074 (0.059) 0.040 (0.061) 
Level 5 0.041 (0.067) 0.035 (0.086) 0.084 (0.077) 0.016 (0.072) 
Level 6 0.041 (0.059) 0.014 (0.077) 0.047 (0.066) 0.023 (0.064) 
Years of unemployment -0.016 (0.018) -0.010 (0.015) -0.018 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016) 
Local unemployment rate (%) -0.006 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.000 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) 
Men 0.012 (0.039) 0.098** (0.041)     
Child in HH 0.081** (0.041) 0.056 (0.042) 0.058 (0.043) 0.071* (0.037) 
Married 0.079** (0.039) -0.022 (0.039) 0.016 (0.041) 0.057 (0.039) 
Migration background 0.060 (0.066) 0.100 (0.070) 0.084 (0.073) 0.081 (0.064) 
East Germany 0.057 (0.058) 0.053 (0.055) 0.032 (0.059) 0.069 (0.054) 
         
Parallel life events         
New job 0.046 (0.044) -0.004 (0.069) 0.019 (0.059) 0.043 (0.048) 
Divorce -0.188 (0.123) -0.038 (0.149) -0.365*** (0.133) 0.086 (0.134) 
Separation 0.349*** (0.071) -0.099 (0.121) 0.156* (0.087) 0.301*** (0.085) 
Death of spouse 0.027 (1.159) 0.121 (0.269) 0.123 (0.357) 0.071 (0.475) 
Marriage 0.049 (0.067) -0.101 (0.126) -0.081 (0.090) 0.067 (0.077) 
Child birth 0.018 (0.066) -0.360 (0.399) -0.274 (0.268) 0.025 (0.067) 
Move -0.080 (0.099) 0.155 (0.207) -0.134 (0.142) 0.039 (0.112) 
         
Pre-treatment job characteristics         
Gross hourly wage (Euros) 0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 
Tenure in years -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Level of occ. autonomy (ref. level 3)         
Level 1 0.096 (0.071) -0.029 (0.069) -0.022 (0.080) 0.085 (0.065) 
Level 2 0.043 (0.044) -0.029 (0.049) -0.036 (0.049) 0.063 (0.045) 
Level 4 -0.038 (0.047) 0.004 (0.046) -0.050 (0.052) 0.024 (0.043) 
Level 5 0.025 (0.088) -0.044 (0.073) -0.052 (0.094) 0.010 (0.071) 
Company size up to 20 Emp. -0.027 (0.037) 0.029 (0.037) 0.002 (0.049) -0.067 (0.047) 
Company size more than 200 Emp. -0.006** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.038 (0.040) -0.020 (0.035) 
Weekly working hours -0.146** (0.061) 0.032 (0.057) -0.005* (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 
Part time contract 0.059 (0.048) -0.042 (0.048) -0.053 (0.054) -0.061 (0.095) 
Public sector -0.027 (0.037) 0.029 (0.037) -0.008 (0.049) 0.010 (0.048) 
Sector of industry (ref. Services)         
Extraction, Exploitation -0.020 (0.093) 0.046 (0.100) 0.011 (0.151) -0.005 (0.084) 
Production -0.006 (0.058) 0.038 (0.066) 0.041 (0.067) -0.015 (0.062) 
Construction -0.006 (0.084) 0.036 (0.095) -0.107 (0.119) 0.009 (0.078) 
Trade, transport -0.041 (0.082) -0.026 (0.087) -0.044 (0.103) -0.055 (0.078) 
Media, finance, real estate -0.085 (0.063) -0.002 (0.073) -0.078 (0.068) -0.047 (0.068) 
Administ., education, health -0.059 (0.064) 0.055 (0.072) -0.016 (0.064) -0.007 (0.073) 
         
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant 0.212** (0.087) 0.246** (0.113) 0.259*** (0.094) 0.243*** (0.094) 
Observations 18,940 18,760 16,602 21,098 
R-squared 0.051 0.062 0.056 0.055 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. The table presents OLS estimates of the change in GRA for certain subgroups indicated by the first column.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group exhibits the average 
age, tenure, actual working hours, net labour/household income, and local unemployment rate. It is female, is not 
living with children in the same household, is not married, its ISCED level of education is 4 and is fulltime 
employed. Household (HH) income weighted by OECD equivalent weights.  
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Table A2. OLS estimations of anticipation and reversion of a job loss on GRA 
 ΔGRA between t = −3 and t = −2 t = −2 and t = −1 t = −2 and t = 0 t = −2 and t = 1 
                  
Job loss between t = -1 and t = 0 0.065 (0.274) -0.309* (0.169) -0.322** (0.144) 0.024 (0.175) 
         
Pre-treatment socio-demographics         
Age in years 0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 
Monthly HH income (log) -0.038 (0.055) -0.011 (0.040) -0.002 (0.034) 0.064 (0.044) 
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)         
Level 1 0.000 (0.394) -0.025 (0.269) 0.248 (0.193) 0.148 (0.252) 
Level 2 0.049 (0.098) 0.079 (0.070) 0.104* (0.059) -0.013 (0.076) 
Level 3 0.036 (0.067) 0.020 (0.049) 0.057 (0.042) -0.007 (0.053) 
Level 5 0.011 (0.083) 0.006 (0.060) 0.043 (0.052) -0.023 (0.064) 
Level 6 0.039 (0.073) 0.018 (0.053) 0.034 (0.046) -0.077 (0.057) 
Years of unemployment -0.017 (0.018) -0.009 (0.014) -0.011 (0.011) 0.014 (0.015) 
Local unemployment rate (%) -0.001 (0.008) -0.010* (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) -0.007 (0.006) 
Men -0.001 (0.045) 0.015 (0.033) 0.056** (0.028) 0.090** (0.036) 
Child in HH -0.001 (0.044) 0.026 (0.032) 0.065** (0.028) 0.074** (0.036) 
Married -0.011 (0.044) 0.001 (0.032) 0.034 (0.028) 0.038 (0.035) 
Migration background 0.082 (0.078) -0.012 (0.057) 0.083* (0.048) -0.004 (0.062) 
East Germany -0.010 (0.060) 0.060 (0.045) 0.051 (0.040) 0.096* (0.050) 
         
Parallel life events         
New job 0.017 (0.060) 0.035 (0.044) 0.029 (0.037) 0.027 (0.049) 
Divorce -0.277* (0.156) -0.120 (0.111) -0.122 (0.095) -0.156 (0.116) 
Separation 0.232** (0.099) 0.169** (0.072) 0.226*** (0.061) 0.108 (0.080) 
Death of spouse 0.401 (0.422) -0.037 (0.304) 0.100 (0.287) 0.183 (0.364) 
Marriage 0.031 (0.101) 0.001 (0.069) 0.005 (0.059) 0.085 (0.077) 
Child birth 0.004 (0.118) 0.041 (0.079) 0.004 (0.065) 0.184** (0.084) 
Move -0.355** (0.161) 0.047 (0.104) -0.036 (0.090) -0.183* (0.111) 
         
Pre-treatment job characteristics         
Gross hourly wage (Euros) 0.000 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) 
Tenure in years 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
Level of occ. autonomy (ref. level 3)         
Level 1 -0.017 (0.084) 0.023 (0.059) 0.034 (0.050) 0.054 (0.063) 
Level 2 0.014 (0.052) -0.003 (0.038) 0.010 (0.033) -0.115*** (0.041) 
Level 4 0.039 (0.053) -0.006 (0.038) -0.015 (0.033) -0.015 (0.041) 
Level 5 0.067 (0.092) 0.048 (0.064) -0.027 (0.056) -0.071 (0.070) 
Company size up to 20 Emp. -0.047 (0.055) -0.035 (0.040) -0.033 (0.034) 0.009 (0.043) 
Company size more than 200 Emp. 0.016 (0.043) -0.001 (0.031) 0.004 (0.026) 0.044 (0.033) 
Weekly working hours -0.003 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Part time contract -0.100 (0.066) -0.101** (0.048) -0.049 (0.042) -0.045 (0.053) 
Public sector -0.025 (0.055) 0.014 (0.040) 0.004 (0.034) 0.043 (0.044) 
Sector of industry (ref. Services)         
Extraction, Exploitation 0.015 (0.105) 0.022 (0.079) 0.007 (0.068) 0.114 (0.086) 
Production 0.032 (0.072) 0.020 (0.051) 0.009 (0.044) 0.090 (0.055) 
Construction 0.006 (0.097) 0.026 (0.073) 0.009 (0.063) 0.140* (0.079) 
Trade, transport 0.071 (0.098) 0.012 (0.071) -0.040 (0.059) 0.031 (0.076) 
Media, finance, real estate 0.113 (0.077) -0.019 (0.055) -0.053 (0.047) -0.078 (0.059) 
Administ., education, health 0.077 (0.077) 0.002 (0.055) -0.005 (0.048) 0.008 (0.060) 
         
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant -0.557*** (0.102) 0.123 (0.076) 0.219*** (0.066) -0.193** (0.083) 
Observations 13,702 25,602 37,700 23,457 
R-squared 0.048 0.038 0.055 0.083 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. The table presents OLS estimates of the change in GRA between the period indicated by the first column.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group exhibits the average 
age, tenure, actual working hours, net labour/household income, and local unemployment rate. It is female, is 
not living with children in the same household, is not married, its ISCED level of education is 4 and is fulltime 
employed. Household (HH) income weighted by OECD equivalent weights.  
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Table A3. OLS estimations by level of skill 
  By hourly wage By level of education By level of autonomy 
       
Job loss between t = -1 and t = 0 0.197 (0.321)     
× Gross hourly wage (Euros) -0.036** (0.016)     
× high skill level (binary)   -0.388* (0.207) −0.416*** (0.161) 
× low skill level (binary)   -0.252 (0.189) −0.214 (0.235) 
No job loss × low skill level (binary)   0.036 (0.027) 0.017 (0.030) 
       
Pre-treatment socio-demographics       
Age in years 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Monthly HH income (log) -0.002 (0.034) -0.002 (0.034) -0.005 (0.034) 
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)       
Level 1 0.248 (0.193)   0.257 (0.192) 
Level 2 0.104* (0.059)   0.108* (0.058) 
Level 3 0.056 (0.042)   0.057 (0.042) 
Level 5 0.043 (0.052)   0.041 (0.052) 
Level 6 0.034 (0.046)   0.028 (0.044) 
Years of unemployment -0.011 (0.011) -0.010 (0.011) -0.010 (0.011) 
Local unemployment rate (%) -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Men 0.056** (0.028) 0.058** (0.028) 0.054* (0.028) 
Child in HH 0.065** (0.028) 0.066** (0.027) 0.064** (0.027) 
Married 0.034 (0.028) 0.034 (0.028) 0.034 (0.028) 
Migration background 0.083* (0.048) 0.089* (0.048) 0.086* (0.048) 
East Germany 0.051 (0.040) 0.051 (0.039) 0.051 (0.040) 
 
   
   
Parallel life events       
New job 0.030 (0.037) 0.030 (0.037) 0.030 (0.037) 
Divorce -0.122 (0.095) -0.122 (0.095) -0.122 (0.095) 
Separation 0.228*** (0.061) 0.226*** (0.061) 0.226*** (0.061) 
Death of spouse 0.099 (0.287) 0.098 (0.287) 0.100 (0.287) 
Marriage 0.004 (0.059) 0.004 (0.059) 0.005 (0.059) 
Child birth 0.003 (0.065) 0.003 (0.065) 0.004 (0.065) 
Move -0.037 (0.090) -0.037 (0.090) -0.036 (0.090) 
 




Pre-treatment job characteristics       
Gross hourly wage (Euros) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
Tenure in years 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Level of occ. autonomy (ref. level 3)       
Level 1 0.033 (0.049) 0.047 (0.049)   
Level 2 0.009 (0.032) 0.009 (0.033)   
Level 4 -0.015 (0.032) -0.009 (0.031)   
Level 5 -0.028 (0.055) -0.023 (0.055)   
Company size up to 20 Emp. -0.033 (0.034) -0.032 (0.034) -0.034 (0.034) 
Company size more than 200 Emp. 0.004 (0.026) 0.005 (0.026) 0.005 (0.026) 
Weekly working hours -0.004** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
Part time contract -0.050 (0.042) -0.050 (0.042) -0.051 (0.042) 
Public sector 0.003 (0.034) 0.006 (0.034) 0.002 (0.034) 
       
Sector dummies yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
       
Constant 0.266*** (0.082) 0.241*** (0.060) 0.214*** (0.066) 
Observations 37,700 37,700 37,700 
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.055 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. The table presents OLS estimates of the change in GRA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The reference group exhibits the average age, tenure, actual working hours, net 
labour/household income, and local unemployment rate. It is female, is not living with children in the same 
household, is not married, its ISCED level of education is 4 and is fulltime employed. Household (HH) income 
weighted by OECD equivalent weights. Interaction terms between two variables are indicated by „×”.  
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Table A4. Estimation results of parametric survival time regression 
  (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) 
              
∆GRA  -0.120*** (0.041) -0.109** (0.045) -0.120*** (0.044) 
       
Men 0.262 (0.191) 0.207 (0.195) 0.270 (0.199) 
       
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)       
Level 1   -0.004 (0.546) -0.048 (0.542) 
Level 2   -0.745 (0.476) -0.790* (0.466) 
Level 3   -0.288 (0.388) -0.307 (0.377) 
Level 5   0.435 (0.529) 0.531 (0.527) 
Level 6   0.393 (0.389) 0.484 (0.396) 
       
Gross hourly wage      -0.017 (0.012) 
       
Log likelihood -0.570 
 
-0.526 -0.519 
Observations 187 187 187 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013. 
Note. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients 
reported, not hazard rates.  154 observations report an exit event. ISCED level and gross 
hourly wage taken in t = −2. ∆GRA denotes change in GRA between t = −2 and t = 0 for 





Table A5. The probabilities of future job loss by plant closure and by other kinds of dismissal 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) 
Dependent Variable Plant closure between t = −1 and t = 0 Dismissed between t = −1 and t = 0 
         
GRA in t = −2  0.010 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012) 0.025*** (0.007) 0.032*** (0.008) 
         
Pre-treatment socio-demographics         
Age in years   0.005 (0.003)   0.015*** (0.002) 
Monthly HH income (log)   -0.038 (0.075)   -0.161*** (0.052) 
ISCED Level (ref. level 4)         
Level 1   0.056 (0.292)   0.349** (0.175) 
Level 2   0.062 (0.120)   0.056 (0.088) 
Level 3   -0.035 (0.093)   0.054 (0.068) 
Level 5   -0.024 (0.121)   0.095 (0.086) 
Level 6   -0.076 (0.109)   0.041 (0.079) 
Years of unemployment   -0.001 (0.021)   0.039*** (0.010) 
Local unemployment rate (%)   0.010 (0.010)   0.006 (0.007) 
Men   0.022 (0.063)   0.047 (0.043) 
Child in HH   0.016 (0.059)   -0.051 (0.041) 
Married   0.044 (0.059)   -0.075* (0.040) 
Migration background   0.150* (0.078)   -0.127** (0.062) 
East Germany   0.056 (0.292)   0.349** (0.175) 
         
Job characteristics in t = −2         
Gross hourly wage (Euros)   -0.012 (0.089)   -0.057 (0.061) 
Tenure in years   0.108 (0.106)   0.031 (0.067) 
Level of occ. autonomy (ref. level 3)        
Level 1   -0.041 (0.093)   0.071 (0.058) 
Level 2   0.096 (0.065)   0.012 (0.046) 
Level 4   0.014 (0.080)   -0.029 (0.061) 
Level 5   -0.253 (0.182)   0.033 (0.128) 
Company size up to 20 Emp.   0.091 (0.065)   0.167*** (0.042) 
Company size more than 200 Emp.   -0.031 (0.059)   -0.132*** (0.043) 
Weekly working hours   0.000 (0.004)   -0.023*** (0.002) 
Part time contract   -0.038 (0.094)   -0.323*** (0.059) 
Public sector   -0.374*** (0.100)   -0.365*** (0.064) 
Sector of industry (ref. Services)         
Extraction, Exploitation   -0.554*** (0.173)   0.016 (0.094) 
Production   -0.235*** (0.072)   0.028 (0.055) 
Construction   -0.207** (0.104)   0.146** (0.070) 
Trade, transport   -0.153 (0.102)   0.045 (0.078) 
Media, finance, real estate   -0.214** (0.085)   0.064 (0.062) 
Administ., education, health   -0.444** (0.100)   -0.109* (0.064) 
         
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
         
Constant -2.629*** (0.078) -2.367*** (0.143) -2.065*** (0.044) -2.152*** (0.101) 
         
Observations 37,700 37,700 38,188 38,188 
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.057 0.006 0.153 
Source. SOEP 2004-2013.  
Note. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group exhibits the average level 
of willingness to take risks, age, tenure, actual working hours, net labour/household income, and local unemployment 
rate. It is female, is not living with children in the same household, is not married, its ISCED level of education is 4 and 
is fulltime employed.         
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2015/1  GÖRLITZ, Katja und Christina GRAVERT 
The effects of increasing the standards of the high school curriculum on school 
dropout 
  Economics 
 
2015/2  BÖNKE, Timm und Clive WERDT 
Charitable giving and its persistent and transitory reactions to changes in tax 
incentives: evidence from the German Taxpayer Panel 
  Economics 
 
2015/3  WERDT, Clive 
What drives tax refund maximization from inter-temporal loss usage? Evidence from 
the German Taxpayer Panel 
  Economics 
 
2015/4  FOSSEN, Frank M. und Johannes KÖNIG 
Public health insurance and entry into self-employment 
  Economics 
 
2015/5  WERDT, Clive 
The elasticity of taxable income for Germany and its sensitivity to the appropriate 
model 
  Economics 
 
2015/6  NIKODINOSKA, Dragana und Carsten SCHRÖDER 
On the Emissions-Inequality Trade-off in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the German 
Car Fuel Tax 
  Economics 
 
2015/7 GROß, Marcus; Ulrich RENDTEL; Timo SCHMID; Sebastian SCHMON und Nikos 
TZAVIDIS 
Estimating the density of ethnic minorities and aged people in Berlin: Multivariate 
kernel density estimation applied to sensitive geo-referenced administrative data 
protected via measurement error 
  Economics 
 
2015/8 SCHMID, Timo; Nikos TZAVIDIS; Ralf MÜNNICH und Ray CHAMBERS 
Outlier robust small area estimation under spatial correlation 
  Economics 
 
2015/9 GÖRLITZ, Katja und Marcus TAMM 
Parenthood and risk preferences 
  Economics 
 
2015/10 BÖNKE, Timm; Giacomo CORNEO und Christian WESTERMEIER 
Erbschaft und Eigenleistung im Vermögen der Deutschen: eine Verteilungsanalyse 
  Economics 
 
 
2015/11 GÖRLITZ, Katja und Marcus TAMM 
The pecuniary and non-pecuinary returns to voucher-financed training 
  Economics 
 
2015/12 CORNEO, Giacomo 
Volkswirtschaftliche Bewertung öffentlicher Investitionen 
  Economics 
 
2015/13  GÖRLITZ, Katja und Christina Gravert 
  The effects of a high school curriculum reform on university enrollment and the 
choice of college major 
Economics 
 
2015/14  BÖNKE, Timm und Carsten SCHRÖDER 
  European-wide inequality in times of the financial crisis 
Economics 
 
2015/15  BÖNKE, Timm; Beate JOACHIMSEN und Carsten SCHRÖDER 
  Fiscal federalism and tax enforcement 
Economics 
 
2015/16  DEMMER, Matthias 
  Improving Profitability Forecasts with Information on Earnings Quality 
FACTS 
 
2015/17  HAAN, Peter und Victoria PROWSE 
Optimal Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance in a Life-cycle Model of 
Family Labor Supply and Savings 
Economics 
 
2015/18  CORNEO, Giacomo, Carsten SCHRÖDER und Johannes KÖNIG 




2015/19 BORGONI, Riccardo; Paola DEL BIANCO; Nicola SALVATI; Timo SCHMID und 
Nikos TZAVIDIS 
Modelling the distribution of health related quality of life of advanced melanoma 




2015/20 HELLER, C.-Philipp; Johannes JOHNEN und Sebastian SCHMITZ 
Congestion Pricing: A Mechanism Design Approach 
Economics 
 
2015/21 BARTELS, Charlotte und Nico PESTEL 
The Impact of Short- and Long-term Participation Tax Rates on Labor Supply 
Economics 
 
2015/22 JESSEN, Robin; Davud ROSTAM-AFSCHAR und Viktor STEINER 
Getting the Poor to Work: Three Welfare Increasing Reforms for a Busy Germany 
Economics 
 
2015/23 BLAUFUS, Kay; Matthias BRAUNE; Jochen HUNDSDOERFER und Martin JACOB 
Does Legality Matter? : The Case of Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
FACTS 
 
2015/24 RENDTEL, Ulrich 
Warum im Zensus die Ergebnisse der Stichprobenmethode keine Benachteiligung 
der großen Gemeinden darstellen: eine Detektivarbeit 
Economics 
 
2015/25 RENDTEL, Ulrich 
Is there a fade-away effect of initial nonresponse bias in EU-SILC? 
Economics 
 
2015/26 BÖNKE, Timm; Matthias GIESECKE und Holger LÜTHEN 
The Dynamics of Earnings in Germany: Evidence from Social Security Records 
Economics 
 
2015/27 GROß, Marcus und Ulrich RENDTEL 
Kernel Density Estimation for Heaped Data 
Economics 
 
2015/28 DWENGER, Nadja; Frank M. FOSSEN und Martin SIMMLER 
From financial to real economic crisis: Evidence from individual firm-bank 
relationships in Germany 
Economics 
 
2015/29 HACHULA, Michael und Sebastian HOFFMANN 




2015/30 EICHFELDER, Sebastian; Frank HECHTNER und Jochen HUNDSDOERFER 
Formula apportionment: Factor allocation and tax avoidance 
FACTS 
 
2015/31 WAGNER, Julia  
EBITDA-Vortrag – cui bono? : Eine Gesetzesevaluation auf Basis einer 
Mikrosimulation 
FACTS 
 
 
